INTRODUCTION

The Chwaka Bay area has witnessed significant changes during the last two decades. Population growth and deterioration in terms of trade within agriculture, a lack of corresponding employment opportunity growth combined with open access to fisheries, have increased pressure on and resulted in over-exploitation of the intertidal zone and shallow-water fisheries (DoE 2009, 28). In addition, terms of trade in aquaculture (seaweed principally), beekeeping, coral rag agriculture and other income generating activities have worsened. Few other coping activities seem to be available. As a result, conflicts over gears and fishing grounds, within and between neighbouring villages, some even with violence and a fatality, have occurred and continues to persist. Defying state rules and regulations, fishermen continue using drag-nets, most of them of small mesh-size. Catching small juvenile fish, the illegal fishing practises erode the basis for the sustainability of fisheries resources (de la Torre-Castro and Lindström 2010).

Tourism is held forward by some as a sustainable alternative income generating activity and by others as an important economic activity vital for development and poverty alleviation. However, in the Chwaka context, tourism seems to aggravate the situation. The industry, which has expanded geometrically and now contributes up to 22 percent of Zanzibar’s GDP (The Citizen, 2 March 2010), is a major cause of a number of conflicts in some parts of Zanzibar (Gössling 2000; 2001; Gössling and Schulz 2005; for a more positive reading, see Lange and Jiddawi 2009). Tourists see reefs as habitats of beautiful fish and fancy corals, excellent for diving and snorkeling, while fishermen see them as an important fishing ground that provides vital protein and income. Tourists generally prefer sandy beaches with the intertidal zone free from rocks, algae and seagrass, while seaweed farmers, mainly women, use the area for their cultivation plots tying the algae to lines stretched between pegs embedded in the soft substrate. The beach resorts that already exist, and those under construction, tend to fence off access to intertidal activities such as fishing and collecting, and their effluents risk polluting the Bay (see chap. 9, 11 and 13).
Local communities feel disempowered. The seaweed mariculture in Chwaka Bay mainly involves women and provides a marginal income which cannot substitute revenues earned from fishing (see chap. 12).

Nor does the tourism industry provide any substantial job opportunities as the majority of employees hail from outside the Bay area. The population in the Bay is predominantly Muslim. This makes handling of alcohol problematic, leading also to socio-cultural conflicts (Gössling 2003, 178-180). While in 2000 there existed only one hotel along the three mile coast between Chwaka and Marumbi, in 2010 a great portion of the coastline had been walled-in, and about eight hotels were under construction or had already opened for tourism (Lindström, personal observation). The Bay-side beach at the other side of Chwaka Bay, along the Michamwi peninsula, is facing a similar development.

**SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS**

Management efforts have so far failed to deliver sustainable use of resources and seem to contribute to problems in the area. Co-management and governance have been suggested as remedies to the failures and often-misaligned objectives of top-down, hierarchical management. The participation of stakeholders in the development and implementation of management schemes and in governance arrangements at all levels is now being proposed (ICAM 1996; TCMP 1996; ICM 2003; DoE 2009).

Current conventional wisdom is that governance and management ought to take place as a complex set of co-operations between the state and civil society, with the market constituting the third wheel under the wagon of success (Rhodes 1996; see also Stoker 1998). At the global level this is for instance codified in the 8th Millennium Development Goal, where references to a “Global Partnership” are made; this has become part and parcel of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans formulated at the nation-state level (RGZ 2002). Not only are plans and strategies across the globe to be developed in an acclaimed partnership between international financial, aid and development institutions such as the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP, and with national governments and representatives of civil society or NGOs, they are also to be implemented and monitored by these partnerships (UNDP 2006). Implementation and monitoring is often the only function of civil society (ActionAid 2004).

This is maybe best illustrated by the emergence of the many governance- and management- with-adjectives that have emerged, epitomized by the “co”- in “co-management” (Carlsson and Berkes 2005). Other epithets that have saturated the conceptual market are the World Bank’s “good” governance; “global” governance (FAO 2006); “earth” governance (Biermann 2007); “adaptive” governance (e.g. Folke et al. 2005); “interactive” governance (e.g. Kooiman et al. 2005); “sustainable” governance (e.g. Agrawal 2001); “co-management” (Jentoft 2000, 2005; Jentoft
Fisheries are critical activities in Chwaka Bay and governing for sustainability is a key issue for all inhabitants in the Chwaka Bay area. Photo: Lars Lindström.
et al. 1998); “adaptive” management (e.g. Walters 1986); and, lately “adaptive co-management” (e.g. Olsson et al. 2007).

In addition, the “local” and the “community” are held forward as the ideal level or “scale” at which governance and management should be implemented. “Local” knowledge should be included in the governance and management processes, which preferably should be “community” driven.

The common denominator of these conceptualizations is their normative-ideological slant. Governance is something good, something that ought to be. What about the empirical-analytical conceptualizations? Is governance and management more or less the same thing? How is governance and management articulated in the context of Chwaka Bay?

I will begin with a theoretical overview which serves to make sense of “governance” and distinguish it from “management”, and which problematizes dominant normative claims linked to notions of “local” and “community”. I will briefly describe how these are articulated on the ground and then turn to an analysis of how the concepts are articulated at a discursive level by analyzing the Draft National ICM Strategies for Zanzibar (RGZ 2009). I will end by suggesting how governance of marine resources may be improved and refer specifically to Chwaka Bay.

**Governance and Management**

Governance has recently and rapidly become one of the most popular concepts among development practitioners and also in the academia. But what does it mean? While the term government denotes the exercise of sovereign rule through the means of a parliamentary chain (Sørensen 2006), governance refers to a complex process in which a multitude of public and private actors interact to coordinate interdependent social relations, from the dyad to the whole social formation (Jessop 1997; 1999; 2002), or global governance. Such coordination occurs in three ideal-typical forms: the hierarchy of imperatives - the iron fist of the state; the anarchy of exchange - the invisible hand of the market; and the heterarchy of self-organization – the joined hands of civil society.

Hierarchical governance may in the Chwaka Bay context be illustrated with, from the top end, international financial and development institutions such as the World Bank, UNEP and the UNDP, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar with its ministries and agencies, and the district offices, to the bottom end, the *bwana dikos*, local beach recorders or monitoring agents (Othman et al. 2003; de la Torre-Castro 2006).

Extraction and use of marine resources are also governed by the anarchical exchange relations within e. g. tourism, fisheries, seaweed farming. While fisheries is embedded in exchange relations that are predominantly local, conditions in tourism and especially seaweed farming are determined by global exchange relations.
Seaweed is exclusively exported to global markets and does not provide any food security.

Finally, the *heterarchy* of self-organization is articulated with fishing “companies”, village fishermen, women and other committees, self-help organization such as micro-credit associations, and Zanzibar and international civil society organizations (advocacy, development, political, etc).

The hierarchical mode is in Chwaka Bay dominating other modes. The local committees in which locals are represented are to a substantial degree creations of the central government and international organizations (interviews by author with committee chairpersons and members), particularly the World Bank within the context of the Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project (MACEMP) (see www.worldbank.org). The locals participate in the committees more by invitation than as a result of self-organization. In addition, the invisible hand of the market plays a far more important role for sustainability than the committees, as it to a large degree defines both species demanded and gears used.

Governance and management sometimes seem to be used interchangeably. A case in point is the study of governance arrangements at the Kisakakasa Mangrove Reserve, where governance is defined as a Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) institution. CBNRM is a “governance institution” and “governance setting” (Saunders et al. 2008, 666). But are they really the same thing? If so, management is just the same old nut in a new shell (governance)? While governance, I would argue, and following from the above, is the coordination of social relations articulated with for example, a plan, program or strategy, management is a set of techniques concerned with the day-to-day operation of that plan, program or strategy. Governance thus sets the stage at which management takes place (Olsen 2003). Collapsing governance and management tends to turn sustainability into something fundamentally technical-managerial and de-politicized.

In addition, most conceptualizations seem to be based on the idea that governance structures and actions, much like management, may be purposely designed. Zanzibar is no exception. In the area of Integrated Coastal Management, governance by design, with or without adjectives, is explicitly or implicitly held forward as the cure to non-sustainable resource use (ICAM 1996; ICM 2003).

Two idealizations – if not idolizations – characterize these dominant conceptualizations of both governance and management. One is the fixation with self-organization as witnessed by the idea of management with “co-”-conceptualization (e.g. Jentoft et al. 1998). The other is the fascination with the “local” and the “community” (e.g. Mohammed 2004; Angerbrandt et al. 2011). Technical managerialism colors both with a tendency to turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to issues of power and its unequal distribution at all scales, a blind eye to politics proper (Mohan and Stokke 2000; 2005).
The partnership, also at the local level, emerges, it is argued, from a process of self-organization, as if all relations within each element in the triad, as well as between them, are characterized by perfectly symmetrical power relations. The same goes for the “local” and “community”, as homogeneity is ascribed to both. There seem, however, to be few examples of successful instances of community-based and -driven development (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Mansuri and Rao 2004).

In order to properly deal with the role of governance - and management for that matter –in creating sustainability we need to address the ways in which they are politically embedded. Governance and management are instances of institutionalized unequal power relationships, constituted by class, gender, ethnicity and the like. Organizations and individuals struggle in and over these instances, shaping them as well as being shaped by them. Most accounts of community-based or community-driven management, of governance-with-adjectives, and of development tend however to be void of analyses of the asymmetrical relationships by which these are shaped.

This negligence suggests a dichotomy similar to Ferdinand Tönnies’ classical distinction between Community (gemeinschaft), which is “based essentially on concord, on the fundamental harmony of wills, and is developed and cultivated by religion and custom” and Society (gesellschaft), which is based on “convention, on convergence or pooling of rational desires; it is guaranteed and protected by political legislation, while its policies and their ratification are derived from public opinion” (Tönnies 2001[1887], 247). Community is seen as homogenous and free from contradictions and severe conflicts (for a critique, see Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Walley 2004 and Angerbrandt et al. 2011).

In Chwaka Bay, the track record tells another story. The conflicts over fishing grounds and fishing methods resulting even in a fatality demonstrate that communities are far from being homogeneous (de la Torre-Castro and Lindström 2010). Heterogeneity within communities is found at the level of attitudes and opinions, for instance vis-à-vis the government and other governance actors (de la Torre-Castro and Lindström 2008), most often related to gear, and thus being material, but not solely. Self-organization and self-regulation at the community level must thus be understood as taking place within these conflictive relationships.

Given that community and society is constituted in these asymmetrical relationships, being at the same time cooperative and conflictive, a number of questions emerge. Who simplifies models and practices that reduce the complexity of the world, and how? Who and with what method, develops the capacity for dynamic, interactive social learning and possibilities of co-ordination? Who builds which method for co-ordinating actions across social forces with different identities, interests, and meaning systems, across different spatio-temporal scales? Who establishes a common world view for action and a system of “metagovernance”
to stabilize key players’ orientations, expectations, and rules of conduct, and how? Who, as Jessop (1997; 2002) asks, functions as a court of appeal for disputes arising within and over governance?

Governance requires the organization of self-organization and the regulation of self-regulation - *metagovernance* (Jessop 1997, 14; Jessop 2002; Kooiman 1993, 46-47) and thus there is a need for a *metagovernor*. The more hands-on this type of metagovernance, the more it can be said to resemble *government*, or sovereign governance. There is accordingly a need to search for the answers to the questions posed above in “the shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf 1994, 40).

One form of governance and metagovernance is found at the discursive level where interests, images of friend-enemy relations, visions of the past and possible futures for individuals and groups, and a common world view for action reducing complexity, are constructed through narratives and ideologies (Jessop 2002; Sørensen 2006). “Community”, “social capital”, “networks”, “decentralization” and “conservation” are dominant concepts within the contemporary discourse simplifying complexity and depoliticizing sustainability.

Another form is the shaping of the political, legal, financial, and organizational structure within which self-organization and regulation takes place and organizing the dialogue for example, within and between different communities and institutions at different levels, as well as defining who may or may not participate (Jessop 2002, 65; Schönleitner 2004).

What are the governance and metagovernance structures articulated with Zanzibar’s ICM plans and strategies? These are analyzed against the backdrop of an understanding of “governance” and “management” as an arena of contestation between different interests; and an arena far from being characterized by horizontal and equal relations of power. The analysis is in the form of a text analysis of the Draft National ICM Strategies for Zanzibar (RGZ 2009). Even though just a draft, the document nevertheless offers an authoritative narrative of both the underlying ideas and organizational structure.

**THE DRAFT NATIONAL ICM STRATEGIES OF ZANZIBAR**

The objectives (p. 8 - 9) of the ICM as proposed in the Draft National Strategy are:

- To preserve the coastal zones for the benefit of current and future generations
- To ensure the sustainable use of natural resources
- To ensure preservation of the integrity of coastal ecosystems, landscapes and geomorphology
To prevent and/or reduce the effects of natural hazards and in particular of climate change

To achieve coherence between public and private initiatives, and between all decisions by public authorities at the national, regional and local levels

To reduce the destruction of coastal habitats such as seagrass meadows and mangrove forests, and to ensure the sustainable use of marine resources, the strategies are to “ensure and strengthen community involvement and participation in the management and conservation of habitats” and “promote marine habitat conservation to increase and maintain fish biomass”. This is to be achieved by “strengthen[ing] existing communities’ sector committees and establish new ones where not available”, by “encourag[ing] communities to establish sustainable savings and credit groups”, by “provid[ing] extension services for sustainable livelihoods activities”, and by “encourag[ing] or/ and support[ing] coastal communities and other investors to initiate environmental friendly alternative livelihoods activities”.

A number of conflicting interests, likely to make the achievement of these goals a problematic task are also identified. Some are conflicts among users of different fishing gears; between tourism and fishery, where tourists see coral reefs as diving sites while fisherfolk see them as fishing grounds; and between seaweed farming and tourism where seaweed farmers are denied access to intertidal areas in front of hotels. The solution, according to the Draft, is to establish and empower organs to manage all these and other conflicts.

What are the institutions through which this is to be done? How are different views on conservation that exist within and between communities, and between different levels to be reconciled? How are differences of interests to be balanced? What are the means through which subordinated groups may voice and influence sustainable management, not to speak of governance itself? Who have access and who have not? Who are included and who are excluded? What is the nature of the regulation of self-regulation and the organization of self-organization?

The Draft is conspicuously silent on these issues. There is an apparent contradiction between the emphasis of community involvement and the top-down fashion through which issues and arenas are defined.

The Draft ICM Organizational Structure

The organizational structure suggested in the Draft is as shown in Figure 1 top-down and hierarchical.

At the highest level, the Zanzibar Steering Committee (ZSC-ICM) shall consist of 16 members from the central government, one member from the private sector and
one representing NGOs. The Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Environment serves as chairperson and appoints the committee members. “Endorse” figures prominently in the description of its competence and activities. The committee “endorses” ICM strategies, guidelines and plans, district ICM Action Plans, and areas of local government participation. It facilitates the resolution of both horizontal intersectoral conflicts, and vertical conflicts between national and local entities (RGZ 2009, 28).

The ICM Unit, whose membership is also decided by the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, prepares budgets and work plans and coordinates the implementation of strategies and plans (RGZ 2009, 28-29).

The Technical Committee is chaired by the Director of Environment. In addition to representatives from ministries and government agencies it also includes one member from the Institute of Marine Sciences (University of Dar es Salaam), and one person representing the NGO sector. The Technical Committee prepares draft
strategies and plans, identifying and recommending areas for local government participation in ICM activities (RGZ 2009, 29).

There shall be four community groups/sector committees for fisheries/mariculture, seaweed farming, agriculture/livestock and forestry/tourism in each Shehia (the local Ward). All community members engaged in any of the four activity groups shall be the members of the group. The membership in each group shall not exceed fifteen and shall select a leadership for their group. The chairman and secretary of each of the four groups form, together with the Sheha, the ICM Committee with the Sheha (local village/ward leader) as chairperson (RGZ 2009, 29).

The regulation of the composition of and number of community groups/sector committees seems contradictory however. On the one hand, all community members engaged in the activity are supposed to be members, while the membership shall not exceed fifteen. With approx. 300 fishers in Chwaka village, this would give rise to about 13-14 committees. Given that these committees are formed by the DFMR (DoE 2009, 24) a qualified guess would be that they form only one committee and appoint its membership as there are no stipulations as to whether they are to be elected or simply appointed by the Government.

Even though NGOs, CBOs, and other representatives of civil society are included in the governance structure, it is at the lower levels, and their participation is limited by expressions such as “may play an important role...if highly involved... in management activities”. They “have an important role to play in the implementation of ICM strategies and plans” but there is “a need to review their program by the Secretariat” (RGZ 2009, 27).

Much of the description of what falls within the competence of the institutions at various levels, with the exception of the community/Shehia level, is expressed in terms of imperatives and sanctioning. Very little room is given for initiatives from below and for cross-level cooperation, and the room for bargaining seems almost non-existent. It is also quite unclear what role the Shehia ICM committee is supposed to play. Neither are there any hints at how the memberships in the four sector committees are to be elected, and how its internal structures should be organized.

Although it is stated that community initiatives to manage their surrounding coastal and marine resources and/or environment are recognized in the Fisheries Act of 1988, the Environmental Act of 1996 and the Forest Act of 1996, and that communities as well as NGOs and CBOs may develop and exercise environmental conservation, it nevertheless follows that it must be approved by the ZSC-ICM.

The recognition of power relationships, at community as well as other levels, and the way these structure views on what is to be managed and how it is to be managed, is conspicuously absent from the Draft. The power balance at state level, in the political, parliamentary sphere, is of course articulated also at the level of government. The bureaucracy is not suspended in mid-air! The state itself institu-
tionalizes asymmetrical relationships, and the way these play out is expressed both at the discursive level as well as in the direct shaping of the regulation of self-regulation and the organization of self-organization. The state as metagovernor does not function, for example, as a court of appeal independent of, and autonomous from, these power relations, but expresses them. It is, I would argue, quite obvious from the Draft itself that there is only one narrative and one set of institutions that articulate this. No institutional framework is shaped to handle alternative narratives. What about, to illustrate, the contradiction between the different interests of present and future generations (Beckman 2008), or the one between social justice and justice for nature (Dobson 1998), the latter which the narrative of “conservation” implies? The committees at community level, as it seems, are at best to be involved in monitoring. This expresses the view of governance and management being purely technical-managerial and de-politicized, that there is total consensus both with respect to the malaise and the medicine.

Emphasis is also put on the need for alternative livelihoods in the face of the destruction of habitats and a depletion of resources, but the state seems to have withdrawn from providing these as the dominant mode suggested is self-help organizations such as institutions of micro-credit and savings.

Although the actual implementation of the Draft (as its currently stands) and its results remain to be seen, it is not a bold guess that the communities and civil society will be excluded from the process of defining problems and solutions, save for being “consulted”, much like the case with “participation” as in the definition of national poverty reduction plans and strategies (ActionAid 2004).

The management of natural resources seems embedded in a technical-managerial mode of governance but also runs the risk of being captured by the powerful at community level, leaving little room for the less powerful to influence for instance conservation (see also chap. 15). How are the sector committees to be held accountable? Who forms the sector committees’ and their constituencies? Who are included and who are excluded?

THE ROAD AHEAD

In order to achieve sustainable use of the marine natural resources in Chwaka Bay, the contradiction between the apparent top-down fashion in which community involvement is regulated and the very idea of self-organized sector committees at community level which taints the Draft ICM National Strategy must be resolved. Metagovernance must be concerned also with the regulation and resolution of conflicts at community level, and not just between conflicting interests of different scales. The gap between the omnipotent Steering Committee at the top of the hierarchy and the powerless sector committees must also be abridged, or otherwise the role of the latter will stop at monitoring, or even worse just lend some artificial democratic legitimacy to both governance and metagovernance.
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